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Should we call a lawyer?
Towards a conceptualisation of norm conflicts for 
International Relations
Lea Wisken
In this post, I argue that traditional legal conceptualisations 
of norm conflicts do not capture the phenomenon that 
International Relations (IR) scholars are interested in. I 
propose an alternative definition, which links norm conflicts 
to political contestation. The number of international 
treaties registered with the UN approximates 50.000. What 
are the odds of all these treaties being consistent? 
Infinitesimally small, one might think. As a result, even IR 
scholars – traditionally concerned with war, power, and 
interest – have become interested in overlapping 
international institutions: what if such overlaps create yet 
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another opportunity for states to use the law as a political 
tool? 
More precisely, IR scholars worry that when overlapping 
institutions issue contradictory norms, states will pick and 
choose between those rules. This may trigger political 
disputes and undermine international cooperation. The 
best-known example of a dispute arising from legal 
fragmentation is the GMO dispute. The EU used the 
Cartagena Protocol precautionary principle to justify import 
restrictions on GMO products. The US, in turn, accused the 
EU of using the Protocol as an excuse to sidestep its WTO 
obligations.
The GMO dispute figures prominently in the International 
Law Commission report on fragmentation and in case 
studies of (potentially) conflicting norms by just about every 
author working in the field, including Krisch, Dunoff, 
Trachtman, Matz-Lück, Young, Gehring, Faude, Oberthür, 
Zelli, and van Asselt. Few case studies examine other 
conflicts. There are no comparative analyses of norm 
conflicts. What explains the discrepancy between the high 
theoretical relevance of norm conflicts and the lack of 
empirical studies? How can the gap be closed?
Tracing the origins of the empirical gap
Behind the empirical gap lie two interrelated problems with 
applying traditional legal conceptualisations of norm 
conflicts to the IR context. First, the legal presumption 
against conflict leads to a very narrow definition of norm 
conflicts. Second, the assumption that international law is a 
legal system implies that conflict is resolved the instant it 
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emerges. There is no such thing as an unresolved norm 
conflict inside a legal system.
According to the traditional objectivist approach, identifying 
norm conflicts can be done purely on the basis of 
juxtaposing treaty rules and applying a list of criteria – an 
“objective standard” – to determine whether they conflict or 
not. The presumption against conflicts leads most lawyers to 
apply very narrow criteria to this test. Most commonly cited 
is Wilfred Jenks’ definition of conflict as the inability to 
follow two rules at the same time. Accordingly, rights and 
exemptions cannot trigger conflict, since they can be 
foregone without breaking the law. This also applies to the 
European right to restrict GMO trade. Jenks’ definition fails 
to capture what triggered maybe the most heated dispute on 
overlapping norms. Other definitions fare only slightly 
better.
The assumption that international law is a unified system 
brings further difficulties. It implies that norm conflicts will 
be resolved through some conflict clause or Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) rule the very 
moment they arise. A legal system may allow for conflicts, 
but it does not, by its very nature, allow for unresolved 
conflicts. However, there is a discrepancy between this 
assumption of unity, and the myriad of disputes related to 
interpreting, applying, and accepting law. No analytical 
distinction is made between norm conflicts that can clearly 
be resolved through one conflict clause, and norm conflicts 
where conflict clauses are ambiguous or VCLT rules 
compete. IR scholars are mainly interested in overlapping 
norms that trigger disputes – not with overlapping norms 
that are in conflict according to some checklist, but where 
everyone agrees which norm prevails.
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Norm conflicts as political contestation
As a result, while IR scholars and international lawyers have 
to date used the same vocabulary of “norm conflicts”, they 
have been talking about fundamentally different things. To 
close the empirical gap, IR scholars need to either introduce 
a new concept, or redefine norm conflicts. I propose an 
alternative, non-objectivist definition of norm conflicts in 
international law: norm conflicts occur in the course of 
political disputes when states justify their different 
standpoints with references to different rules of 
international law and disagree about which rule prevails. 
This conceptualisation does not merely capture a special 
type of political dispute, it also says something meaningful 
about the relations between the two rules: they are being 
interpreted in incompatible ways and states disagree about 
which rule prevails.
Norm conflicts always come with a concrete political dispute, 
(at least) two concrete disputed rules, and two contending 
parties, composed of one or more states. The concreteness 
requirements exclude resource conflicts, which have always 
existed independent of legal fragmentation. The threshold 
requirement of state participation ensures international 
relevance.
The obvious criticism of this conceptualisation is that 
conflict can exist below the surface, without erupting into 
open contestation. Yet how can one know about suppressed 
conflict, if no party shows signs of discontent? That would 
be like claiming that it is possible for an outsider to identify 
marital conflict, even if both husband and wife seem 
perfectly happy. In international law, the objectivist 
checklist-approach will find many incompatibilities without 
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political relevance. It will also dismiss many tensions with 
political relevance. My conceptualisation, by contrast, treats 
those norms whose overlap leads to real-world disputes 
about legal behaviour as conflicting. I will only say that a 
couple has a conflict when I have evidence they have been 
fighting.
My conceptualisation successfully performs a crucial 
balancing act: it is sufficiently narrow to exclude cases 
where one norm clearly and undisputedly takes precedence. 
At the same time, it is sufficiently wide to not exclude all
cases where tensions between rules can be resolved through 
some conflict clause. After all, conflict rules like lex specialis 
or lex posterior often point in different directions. Norm 
conflicts exist only if conflict clauses fail to establish 
sufficient legal clarity to forestall political contestation. No 
skills of treaty interpretation are needed to identify 
them. This alternative conceptualisation of norm conflicts 
should enable IR scholars to close the empirical gap. It would 
be interesting to see whether international lawyers working 
on legal fragmentation can also benefit from this 
conceptualisation.
Lea Wisken is a PhD student at the Berlin Graduate School of 
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This post is part of our conference symposium “The Promises 
of International Law and Society”. Other posts in this series 
can be accessed here.
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